Lithuania and the Three Seas Initiative

10/02/2025

Matija Horvat, member of the Executive Board of the Croatian think tank Centre for Public Policy and Economic Analysis (CEA). The article has been originally published by the Warsaw Institute (Three Seas Partnership).

Introduction

The Republic of Lithuania is a member of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) from the outset of this partnership. It is also a member of the EU, NATO, and OECD, and participates in the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8), regional cooperation format, as well as in the organization of Bucharest Nine (B9). From the beginning of the 21^st century (and in the 1990s or even before) Lithuania (like other Baltic states or CEE states in general) is aware of all the challenges related to Russian imperialism.

Because of the looming Russian threat, their foreign and security policy remains dedicated to pro-Western values, associations, or alliances. Like all Baltic and (almost all) CEE states, Lithuania is also a staunch advocate for Ukraine in its (and our) fight against Russia and in other matters (like Ukraine’s accession to all Western associations, partnerships, or alliances).

Regarding Russian aggression and security through 3SI, current Prime Minister of Lithuania Ingrida Šimonytė underlined the following: “To expect that the aggressor’s imperialistic ambitions stop in Ukraine is naive, irrational, wishful, short sighted and unforgivable. […] Security is not everything, but without it, there is not much else…”[1]

Lithuania is a good example of a small state that has transformed from a post-soviet republic to an active political player in the regions of East Central and Northern Europe. This proud Baltic State has gone from initial skepticism to current readiness to assume leadership in 3SI. Accordingly, Lithuania has increased its participation in the 3SI intensively, especially over the last four years.[2] It takes the view that the 3SI must be in a close relationship with the EU and NATO policies. The main Lithuanian priorities in the Three Seas Initiative are energy and transportation development projects, especially new railway and highway networks. These projects will deepen Lithuania’s integration with the EU, opening new possibilities for cooperation also with Ukraine, bypassing Belarus and Russia.

Lithuanian policy toward the 3SI

It is important to emphasize that during 2024 Lithuania – like many other countries – is going through the so-called super-election year. Presidential elections were held in May and the outgoing Head of State, Gitanas Nauseda, was re-elected with 75.29% of the vote. The Lithuanian people again voted in the European elections in June, where center-right Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS – LKD), won most of the votes (approx. 21.3%).

However, in parliamentary elections in October 2024 the oppositional, center–left, Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (LSDP) took the leading place (in 1^st round of election) with approximately 20% of the votes. During the second round of voting for the new parliament the Social – Democrats won 52 seats (19.32%) in Parliament (Seimas) and will form a coalition with “For Lithuania”, plus “The Farmers” and “Greens” Union.[3]

There is a potential danger in the alignment of the new populist party Nemunas Dawn (Nemuno aušra), but all parties agreed to make cordon sanitaire against them. The Social Democrats have ruled out going into government with Nemunas Dawn, led by a former MP, Remigijus Zemaitaitis, who resigned last year over allegedly antisemitic comments and is on trial on charges of inciting hatred, which he denies.[4]

Despite the expected change in government, no major foreign policy changes are anticipated.[5] Accordingly, it is unlikely to affect Lithuania’s position as one of the most vocal critics of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Parties generally agree that the country needs to increase defense spending, currently at 3.2% of GDP, to prevent Moscow from potentially challenging NATO borders.[6]

Although President of the Republic Nauseda and (until October 2024 ruling) conservative TS – LKD party had its domestic disagreements they see 3SI in a similar affirmative way. For example, president Nauseda emphasized that the 3SI is a strategic tool that contributes to the strengthening of relations between the states of the region and the United States, as well as to regional and national security. He considers 3SI as a unique tool and sees this platform in strengthening the region’s soft power through the development of infrastructure and technology.[7]

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Gabrielius Landsbergis also pointed out the following:”As one of the goals of the Three Seas Initiative is to strengthen not only the positions of member states within the European Union but also bilateral relations between participating countries, we believe that the Three Seas Initiative can further contribute to the strengthening of their positions at the European Council level.”[8]

Members of the Lithuanian Parliament, e.g. Laurynas Kasčiūnas – chairman of the National Security and Defense Committee – also stressed that 3SI is more an economic project and the main idea is to strengthen the north-south direction in the infrastructural sense, and by strengthening this direction to reduce the divide within the European Union between the west and the east, so that the economy and infrastructure of the countries of this region are equal to those in Western Europe.[9]

The Vilnius Summit

Lithuania chaired the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) and organized the 3SI Summit, as well as the 3SI Business Forum in Vilnius, in April 2024. This was the ninth 3SI Summit and the sixth business forum. Lithuania addressed key issues of the 3SI. The fundamental goal of the 3SI remains bold – to enhance regional cooperation on infrastructure and connectivity for a resilient Europe and a stronger transatlantic partnership.

In the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the participants, including many internationally renowned experts, discussed the significance of helping Ukraine to defend itself and the necessity of continuing to support it with all means until victory. The 3SI reaffirmed its unwavering support for Ukraine, its sovereignty and territorial integrity.[10]

One of the pillars of the 3SI is the development of digital connectivity in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, Lithuania has proposed the establishment of a 3SI Cyber Security Platform. The participants agreed that this is the time for effective cooperation among all the services and institutions working with cybersecurity platforms in the Three Seas region, and cybersecurity is more than just a fight against disinformation – it is also essential in building resilient supply chains and protecting our markets.[11]

Among other things, the participants of the annual Business Forum discussed the long-term goals of the 3SI, with a special focus on energy security and climate change, neutral economy development, transport improvement, consolidation of transatlantic cooperation, and support to the integration of the associated EU Member States, in particular, Ukraine and Moldova.[12]

Current projects:

Priority project updates are made annually and presented during the 3SI Summits. Currently, Lithuania participates in 11 projects in 3SI:

1. Gas Interconnector Republic of Poland-Republic of Lithuania (GIPL) [completed]

2. Integration and synchronization of the Baltic States’ electricity system with the European networks

3. Connection of offshore wind farm to the electricity transmission grid of Lithuania

4. Rail Baltica

5. Via Baltica

6. Purchase of the FSRU INDEPENDENCE (Klaipėda LNG terminal)

7. 5G Cross-Border Transport Corridors for Connected and Automated Mobility CAM in Baltics

8. Installation of electricity storage facilities (200 MW) (completed)

9. Development of serial production of M3 class electric buses

10. Power to Gas Pilot Project

11. The green fuel (hydrogen) production plant and public hydrogen refueling stations at Port of Klaipeda.[13]

Some of those projects show how Lithuania cooperates with neighboring countries, e.g. Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and even Finland, but we also emphasize the strategic link with the USA (e.g. Klaipeda LNG terminal).

GIPL gas pipeline

GIPL gas pipeline aims at connecting the gas transmission systems of the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Lithuania, and consequently, integrating the isolated gas markets of Baltic States (and the Republic of Finland) with the Polish and EU gas markets.

This 508 km gas pipeline also strengthens energy independence in the region and increases the utility of the Klaipeda LNG terminal. After Lithuania gave up Russian gas imports completely at the beginning of Russian full – scale invasion on Ukraine, the Energy Ministry said that the country’s gas needs would be fully met by Klaipėda LNG terminal, which would receive three large LNG cargoes each month from the USA[14] and has ensured full occupancy until 2033.[15]

The GIPL gas pipeline was commissioned in May 2022[16] and has a value of about 500 million EUR (approx. 60% of the funds were allocated by the European Commission) and represents the largest investment in the Lithuanian gas transmission system since the country’s independence. Latvian and Estonian gas transmission system operators also contributed to the financing. The 3SI contributed to the project’s implementation.

Rail Baltic

Rail Baltica is a greenfield (870 km) rail transport infrastructure project with the goal of integrating the Baltic States into the European rail network. The project includes five European Union countries – Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and indirectly Finland, as it will connect Warsaw with Helsinki. This high-speed (max. 249 km/h) train (under – construction) infrastructure project is strategic for Lithuania, and it will be environmentally friendly (fully electrified, without emissions).[17]

When finished, Rail Baltica will be a symbolic return of the region to the European railway system (1435 mm rails), after Russian occupation (1945 – 1990/91), because it will mean the return of the North-South railway axis (instead of Russian-oriented East – West, using 1520 mm gauge system).

The Via Baltic

The main objectives of this project are to create a high-quality road infrastructure, to enhance the safety of passengers and freight mobility, to reduce the number of road accidents and fatalities, to save travel time and to ensure a high level of environmental protection. This Baltic route is one of the most important transit arteries in Eastern Europe. There is no other transport corridor for the Baltic states in the North-South direction. The length of the road in Lithuanian territory is 269 km.[18] Some separate sections and implementation traffic management solutions are co-financed by EU investment funds.

Both rail and road projects for the Baltic states are planned to meet the standards required for the rapid deployment of NATO forces – this is a logistical necessity for the region.[19] Lithuania is a NATO frontline state that is strongly affected by the Russian threat but has little military potential of its own. Its only defensive strategy, therefore, is to delay an enemy until allied support forces can arrive. This makes transport and communication infrastructure of almost existential significance.[20]

Policy recommendations

In the broader picture of the entire 3SI, some key areas for Lithuania must not be abandoned and some projects must be improved.

It is widely recognized that Lithuania has – in the most positive sense of the word – vanguard relation to the assertive People’s Republic of China (PRC) or Chinese communist party (CCP). It has accused China of violating human rights in Xinjiang and conducting fraudulent elections in Hong Kong.[21] Moreover, in 2021 Taiwan opened its representative office in Lithuania. To be exact, Taiwan and Lithuania have opened trade offices in both capitals, Taipei and Vilnius, and trade between the two countries has grown ever since.

This valorous diplomatic act also means political danger for Lithuania. E.g. President Nauseda said in the context of the stabilization of relations with China, he would see the need to change the name of Taiwan’s representative office in Lithuania.[22] This question will probably be one of the challenges for the new government in Lithuania after this year’s October elections. Will the center-left government lead different policies toward the PRC or CCP? Nevertheless, Lithuania should stay on this courageous and moral path despite the belligerent manners of the PRC or CCP.

To be specific, we already know that 3SI could offer an alternative engagement model to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, and our (we could say) alliance of democratic (European) states (which 3SI certainly needs to be) is already in partnership with the US and Japan. So, China’s policy must be firm, and relations with the de facto independent Taiwan need to be continued – not just in the case of Lithuania.

We must also emphasize that Lithuania is more (than others) vocal about the Iranian regime. To be specific, Lithuania’s parliament passed a resolution designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization[23] and their stance toward Russia and the Ukrainian fight for freedom is commonly acknowledged. This is the way all Allies (not just in 3SI) should do.

Lithuania should also stay on a stable path with neighboring countries and Allies. Namely, Lithuania must complete the motorway and railway infrastructure faster and more efficiently. For example, Polish media are calling for more pressure on the Baltic States to complete this road and rail corridor much faster.[24] Poland sees Via Baltica as a crucial (North-South) artery for NATO logistics in the case of the Russian kinetic threat, while Lithuania thinks that all the problems can be solved through the port of Klaipeda and other Baltic ports.

Although the 3SI is not a military alliance, the infrastructure and energy projects it advocates are of great importance in the event of a potential war, when military mobility and reducing energy dependence are key areas that we all must protect.[25]

If Lithuania looks at the initiative primarily through an economic lens, it does not mean that it should completely ignore the necessary security or defense aspects. Namely, the geographical position of Lithuania, along the Suwalki corridor, Kaliningrad, and Belarus does not give anyone the privilege of viewing any partnership only as an economic tool. In any case, the Baltic region needs to be vigilant and ready, because the enemy never sleeps – and they know it to be true.

Conclusion

Lithuania has a long history of independent statehood (along with Poland). However, after the tempestuous 20^thcentury, was at first skeptical about the 3SI. Nowadays this nation of approximately 2.8 million citizens has become one of the most active participating countries in the 3SI. Their economic priorities, such as transportation, energy, and cyber security are crucial in the context of security and defense. Like in any other nation, their domestic political rivalries must stay firmly on the European and Transatlantic side, with Western values and with the rule of law – the backbone of liberal democracy.

Like other Baltic states, Lithuania would also like to engage in deeper cooperation with Finland. The participation in the initiative is positive for the Baltic states, which through appropriate investments in infrastructure and connectivity will experience economic growth.[26]Lithuania would also like to open a discussion about the 3SI’s budget and funding.[27]But the most important theatre now is in Ukraine. We all need the victory of freedom, democracy, international law, and Western values. In that context, the 3SI should also do everything that can be done, and potentially strengthen dual-use infrastructure for NATO. Moreover, the 3SI is a part of the wider efforts of democratic countries to drive values and market-based investments into connectivity.

3SI countries are the frontier of Europe, and it is of utmost importance that they are well equipped to defend their borders[28]. Marking 10 years of the 3SI will be a moment to evaluate, not just Lithuania’s, but general achievements and reflect on possible policy directions in the future. While we all need to continue with the current projects, there is also room for new policies within the 3SI.[29]

[1] https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/features/the-three-seas-initiative-calls-for-cooperation-and-security-in-central-and-eastern-europe-but-can-it-deliver/?cf-view

[2] The Three Seas Initiative, An original concept of regional cooperation in different approaches Institute, ed. Agnieszka Orzelska-Stączek, 2024.

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/lithuania-opposition-seeks-cement-election-win-run-off-votes-2024-10-27/

[4] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/28/lithuania-social-democratic-party-election-winner-bolster-defence-russia-threat

[5] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241013-centre-left-set-to-win-as-pro-ukraine-lithuania-votes

[6] https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/business/politics/2024/10/14/income-gap-concerns-drive-opposition-win-in-lithuanian-election/

[7] https://lrp.lt/en/media-center/news/the-president-stressed-the-importance-of-transatlantic-cooperation-for-the-three-seas-initiative/36289

[8] https://mvep.gov.hr/press-22794/croatia-confirms-commitment-to-3si-goals-assumes-presidency-in-2026/272178

[9] https://www.lrs.lt/sip/portal.show?p_r=35403&p_k=2&p_t=285326&p6=28

[10] https://www.3seas.eu/about/past-summits/vilnius-summit-2024

[11] https://3seas.eu/media/news/the-future-of-cybersecurity-and-the-three-seas-initiative-ultimately-it-all-boils-down-to-trust

[12] https://3seas.eu/media/news/special-focus-on-lithuania-vilnius-will-host-the-three-seas-initiative-business-forum-on-11-april