Croatian policy toward the Three Seas Initiative is written by Daniel Hinšt, a member of the Executive Board of the Croatian think tank Centre for Public Policy and Economic Analysis (CEA). The article has been originally published by the Warsaw Institute (Three Seas Partnership).
Introduction
The Three Seas Initiative (3SI) encourages trade, energy security, vertical transport connectivity, and investments in infrastructure. Croatia’s role within the 3SI has mainly been associated with the LNG terminal on the island of Krk, strongly backed by the EU and the US, while other infrastructure and energy projects would be important for military mobility. The 3SI was launched in 2015 by Croatian President Kolinda Grabar Kitarović and Polish President Andrzej Duda.[1] Therefore, Croatia and Poland have important roles within the 3SI.
Considering the 3SI, Polish President Duda stresses the great importance of the EU enlargement to Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and the Western Balkans, and their reforms that will determine the speed of a merit-based enlargement, based on upholding European values and full alignment with the EU’s CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy). Duda also welcomes the fact that Croatia will host the 2026 3SI Summit and Business Forum.[2] Hereby, it is important to stress the vital geopolitical role of Poland in strengthening the 3SI.
The Croatian think tank Centre for Public Policy and Economic Analysis has a potential for 3SI cooperation in several policy areas, especially in increasing defense spending, close intelligence cooperation[3], detecting disinformation, policy coordination of free market reforms, and other areas.[4]
Croatian policy toward the 3SI
While the populist center-left Croatian President Zoran Milanović sees 3SI as potentially harmful and unnecessary, against Moscow and Berlin, forcing countries to purchase US LNG and isolating Russia[5], the center-right Government led by Andrej Plenković, strongly supports the Three Seas Initiative.
The Bucharest Summit
In September 2023, at the 3SI summit and Business Forum in Bucharest, Prime Minister Andrej Plenković confirmed Croatia’s politicalcommitment to cooperation within the Three Seas Initiative and continuous support to energy and transport projects. Moreover, numerous Croatian businesses participated in the Business Forum[6], which shows the interest of Croatian businesses in regional cooperation and partnerships.
Plenković offered Croatia’s ports for the export of Ukrainian grain due to the collapse of the Black Sea route. He explained that Croatia sees itself as the Mediterranean gateway to Central Europe, especially the port of Rijeka, and emphasized the importance of the Croatian railway connection between Rijeka on the Adriatic Sea and the port of Vukovar on the Danube. Also, Romanian President Klaus Werner Johannis underlined the importance of the economic presence of the United States in the region, as a strategic catalyst for security.[7] Like Johannis, Plenković emphasized the importance of cooperation with the United States, which gives a transatlantic dimension. In addition, Plenković mentioned Croatia’s energy independence policy supported by investments in the increased capacity of LNG terminal (Krk) a lot of gas pipelines (Zlobin-Bosiljevo), as a contribution to the Three Seas Initiative, and strengthening the European energy market. Concerning Ukrainian food security, Minister of Economy of Ukraine Yulia Svyrydenko confirmed that Ukrainian grain has been exported through Croatian ports.[8]
The Vilnius Summit
In April 2024, during the 9th Summit of the Three Seas Initiative in Vilnius, Croatian Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Gordan Grlić Radman encouraged stronger cooperation in military mobility, critical infrastructure, and cyber security. He stressed that the 3SI gathers almost half of the EU Member States, and strategic partners such as the US, EU, Germany, and Japan. That way, Croatia remains anchored within the transatlantic community and as a reliable partner in the energy diversification within Central Europe. The Croatian foreign minister mentioned that, in comparison to the 2023 Bucharest Summit, Croatia has nominated seven new EU-funded projects in the Catalogue of Strategic Projects of 3SI. The total value of these projects is around 4 billion euros, and all of them have been accepted. Furthermore, Grlić Radman had a bilateral meeting with Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis. The two ministers confirmed excellent bilateral relations, including Lithuania’s strong support for Croatia’s OECD membership by sharing its accession experiences, and gratitude for Croatia’s participation in NATO Enhanced Forward Presence activities in Lithuania. Finally, it was confirmed that Croatia will host the 2026 3SI Summit and Business Forum, considering the 10th anniversary of the Dubrovnik Declaration, the establishing document of the 3SI.[9] The Croatian foreign ministersaid that by co-founding the initiative together with Poland, Croatia showed a far-reaching vision of geopolitical circumstances.[10]
Many Croatian companies participated in the Vilnius Business Forum.[11] The discussion included the strategic LNG and Rijeka Gateway projects, and potential funding of geothermal projects through the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund.[12]
The virtual summit
At a virtual summit of the Initiative in October 2020, formally hosted by Estonia, Prime Minister Andrej Plenković confirmed the Croatian government’s commitment to the strategic goals of 3SI. He announced Croatia’s contribution up to of 20 million euros to the 3SI investment fund through the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Also, he expressed hope for a stronger future role of Germany and the European Commission in the 3SI.[13]
LNG terminal on Krk
The LNG terminal on Krk is certainly the most important strategic project, which brings a strong Croatian contribution to the 3SI and broader European energy security.
Considering energy independence and security, Croatia made a strategic decision to increase the capacity of its LNG terminal on Krk from 3.1 to 6.1 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas per year. Moreover, Croatia plans investments in renewable energy sources – geothermal, solar, and wind energy, continued functionality of the nuclear power plant in Krško, and building gas pipelines that will be suitable for future transporting of hydrogen.[14] The capacity growth gas pipeline investment on the Zlobin-Bosiljevo route, and towards Hungary and Slovenia. The total investments are worth around 533 million euros, as a part of efforts for Croatia to become the energy hub.[15]
In May 2024, the European Commission approved 25 million euros of Croatian state aid for the expansion of the LNG terminal on Krk. Such a measure is partially financed by the EU Recovery and Resilience Mechanism (RRF). In particular, it will finance the installation of an additional gasification module with a capacity of 250 000 cubic meters, to achieve a new maximum gasification capacity of 700 000 cubic meters per hour, corresponding to 6.1 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year. The support is a direct grant to LNG Hrvatska, the state-run company that is a holder and operator of the terminal. The project is necessary for gas supply for Croatia and Southeast Europe, in order to end dependence on Russian fuels, which is in line with the REPowerEU plan. Therefore, the Commission concluded that such aid is proportionate because it represents a limited necessary minimum, while its positive effects outweigh possible negative effects on market competition in the EU.[16]
Policy recommendations
The Centre for Public Policy and Economic Analysis sees a policy potential in several key areas where individual national efforts and cooperation could be improved. The most important one is defense.
Croatia’s defense spending in GDP exceeded 2% several years ago.[17] However, due to strong GDP growth rates[18] Croatia’s ratio of defense spending was estimated by NATO at 1.81% of GDP in 2024, while Poland exceeded 4% and occupied the leading position within NATO.[19] Considering the challenge, Croatia plans to further modernize its military equipment[20], including tanks[21], after procurement of 89 US Bradley tanks[22], 8 US Black Hawk helicopters[23], 12 French Rafale fighter jets[24], and other equipment.
However, it has been a long time since the 2% target was agreed upon; before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has increased the geopolitical risk for Europe. Moreover, Europe needs to consider strengthening its anti-missile defense, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, there is an opportunity for intelligence cooperation with 3SI,under the model of the Five Eyes (the UK, US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), with openness for private intelligence enterprises, and their additional and complementary contributions to national securities[25] based on the US outsourcing model.[26] Accordingly, 3SI members could coordinate their national efforts regarding military aid to Ukraine, which directly depends on efforts to increase defense spending within the EU and NATO.
Furthermore, there is an additional opportunity to create policy communities and jointly funded clusters for detecting disinformation[27] from Russia and China that represent serious risks for NATO, the EU[28], Ukraine, Taiwan, and Israel. In addition, Iran, and its allied proxies also deserve strong attention since their pro-Hamas and pro-Palestinian disinformation seriously affects public opinion across the EU and US, including in the 3SI region. Therefore, 3SI members should work together, and directly with Ukraine, Taiwan, and Israel, to tackle such security threats from disinformation and hostile influence, especially through educational curriculums.
Also, 3SI countries could cooperate closely on coordinating their policies, to learn best practices, especially regarding economic freedom[29], its methodology[30] and important institutional reforms[31], including the rule of law. Deficits in institutional governance pose a risk for joint foreign and security policy efforts within the EU and NATO. Therefore, all members of the 3SI should work on themselves to ensure short-term and long-term governance improvements concerning freedom and democracy. Also, adding new policies can create a broader framework for development[32] in the region that faced communism.
Finally, 3SI could offer an alternative engagement model to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, and potentially strengthen dual-use infrastructure for NATO. Moreover, the 3SI is a part of the wider efforts of democratic countries to drive values- and market-based investments into connectivity. Therefore, the Three Seas Initiative should be developed into a platform for private-sector investments building private-public partnerships, and the transatlantic alliance.[33] Moreover, The Three Seas Initiative is a golden opportunity to defend the interests of its members on the global stage.[34] Such interests can only be defended based on strong values and clear positions against adversarial actors like Russia, China, Iran, and their proxies.
Conclusion
The additional policy potential should be discussed amid the celebration of ten years since the initiation of the Three Seas Initiative. Strengthening further cooperation depends on investing more in defense and intelligence capacities, detecting disinformation, additional freedom-oriented reforms, and strategic public, and valuable private projects. In addition, there is a strong potential for broader policy cooperation between policymakers, institutions, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector.
[1] https://www.cea-policy.hr/inicijativa-tri-mora/
[2] https://www.president.pl/news/joint-declarationof-the-ninth-summit-of-the-three-seas-initiative,83857
[3] https://www.cea-policy.hr/untapped-potential-three-seas-initiative/
[4] https://threeseaspartnership.com/index.php/potencjal-polityczny-inicjatywy-trojmorza/
[5] https://n1info.hr/english/news/a565888-milanovic-says-three-seas-initiative-unnecessary-potentially-harmful/
[6] https://vlada.gov.hr/news/croatia-is-committed-to-strengthening-cooperation-within-the-three-seas-initiative/42333
[7] https://glashrvatske.hrt.hr/en/foreign/three-seas-initiative-leaders-meet-in-bucharest-11017738
[8] https://www.croatiaweek.com/the-three-seas-initiative-summit-and-croatias-important-role/
[9] https://mvep.gov.hr/press-22794/croatia-confirms-commitment-to-3si-goals-assumes-presidency-in-2026/272178
[10] https://glashrvatske.hrt.hr/en/politics/grlic-radman-croatia-showed-a-far-reaching-vision-by-co-founding-the-three-seas-initiative-11462510
[11] https://izvoz.gov.hr/vijesti/hrvatske-tvrtke-na-poslovnom-forumu-inicijative-triju-mora-u-litvi/6157
[12] https://novac.jutarnji.hr/novac/infobox/poslovni-forum-inicijativa-triju-mora-u-vilniusu-ondje-su-i-predstavnici-hrvatskih-gospodarstvenika-15449555
[13] https://mvep.gov.hr/press-22794/croatia-remains-committed-to-three-seas-initiative/196850
[14] https://vlada.gov.hr/vijesti/sastanak-europske-politicke-zajednice-lng-terminal-cini-hrvatsku-ozbiljnim-energetskim-cvoristem/42756
[15] https://vijesti.hrt.hr/hrvatska/prosirenje-kapaciteta-lng-terminala-na-krku-11591506
[16] https://www.hina.hr/vijest/11612701
[17] https://mvep.gov.hr/press-22794/by-investing-in-its-own-defence-and-security-croatia-is-strengthening-nato/249318
[18] https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-economies/croatia/economic-forecast-croatia_en
[19] https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf
[20] https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/army-news-2024/croatia-plans-to-modernize-military-equipment-and-may-transfer-old-gear-to-ukraine#google_vignette
[21] https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/hrvatska-kupuje-30-novih-tenkova-evo-o-kojem-modelu-se-radi-20240810
[22] https://www.morh.hr/en/acquistion-of-bradely-infantry-fighting-vehicles-is-a-continuation-of-strategic-partnership-between-croatia-and-the-united-states/
[23] https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2024-07-12-Croatia-Triples-Black-Hawk-Fleet-with-Purchase-of-Eight-Additional-Helicopters
[24] https://www.dassault-aviation.com/en/group/press/press-kits/the-rafale-enters-service-in-the-croatian-air-force/
[25] https://threeseaspartnership.com/index.php/potencjal-polityczny-inicjatywy-trojmorza/
[26] https://austriancenter.com/croatia-could-take-outsourcing-lessons-from-america-and-britain/
[27] https://threeseaspartnership.com/index.php/potencjal-polityczny-inicjatywy-trojmorza/
[28] https://hrcak.srce.hr/en/267456
[29] https://threeseaspartnership.com/index.php/potencjal-polityczny-inicjatywy-trojmorza/
[30] https://hrcak.srce.hr/257707
[31] https://hrcak.srce.hr/266914
[32] https://threeseaspartnership.com/index.php/potencjal-polityczny-inicjatywy-trojmorza/
[33] https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/3-seas-initiative-americas-opportunity-europe-advance-national-interests
[34] https://newdirection.online/event/three_seas_initiative